

knowing for some time in what dhvt'tion h<> had gone. This doubt respecting Binder's movi'int'iits occasioned an uncertainty and delay in those of the French which were afterwards attended with the very worst consequences.¹ It cannot be doubted that there was some error in Napoleon's calculation as to the movements of the Prussians, and the consequent directions given to Grouchy by him.² Napoleon

¹ Napoleon no longer had by his side Berthier, who had accompanied him as his Chief of the Staff (Major-General) throughout his career, but Berthier had deserted his old friend in his distress in 1814, but Napoleon was now prepared to welcome him back, only laughingly threatening to make him appear in his dress of Captain of the Guard to Louis XVII. Berthier was on his way to join Napoleon when he met his death in a hasty manner, either throwing himself or being thrown from a balcony. His place was taken by Soult, who had been appointed Minister of War by Louis XVIII. in December, 1814. He was a better choice than his predecessor Dujoult (of Baylcy), and he had appeared to throw himself into the arms of the Bourbons, but his good faith was suspected, and on 10th March, 1815, he was succeeded by Clarke, the Duke of Feltre, who had long held the highest post under Napoleon, but who now, calculating Irishman as he was, definitely took the Bourbon side. Soult joined his old commander after some hesitation, and was appointed Chief of the Staff, a post which it at least might have expected. Soult's performance of the duties of his new post has been much criticized by those who believed in the perfection of the staff under Berthier, and some of the misfortunes of the campaign have been attributed to the influence of the former Major-General. The truth is, that the service of the staff had never been thoroughly well done, the *Mv.mnir* p/ l)e /•» ^im«c provo thin. It wan taken for granted that an aide de c_crw/» always had a good horse and knew his way: an officer sent with a message did not <htre to even iiftk whore he was to find the intended recipient. If the fuihett f_cij>p*»ii^ there to have been failure) to give Grouchy full orders to keep in touch with the main army is to fall at all on Soult. Berthier must bear the heavier responsibility of the failure to support Vamalanme at Kulm-- a much greater loss than the absence of IrKi-lon's division from the actual fight at Qmptre liratami Ligny can be matched by the absence of Ilenmdotti's front Kytu. The truth is, that the army was an improvised army, in which tin* htaff w_c pretty certain to t>e the greatest sufferer from its rats>i<1 formation, nith that when an army is beaten, the faults and failures of every one are pointed out or invented, while when an army is successful every one *In inti'r*»tt*i* in ifuvtig tb_c lilou in shade, a point on which the Duke of Wellington waits very urgent about Waterloo.*

* For Grouchy's part in this campaign see his *Memoir** and the *Qbnrvntion* sñr la Relation ae tit (jamptwiw <li* IHift pitbrite /<ir le ^i^n/rnl qintryittiU*, by Grouchy's son, the Ointe da Grouchy; Paris, C_ctmitmorot, Witt. 'A IMC* lie

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Marshal Grouchy, l(M9<7t^n 1815, imrw Mtirqui rli? <f/r<w*7iy, Observation* writ** Oyrfintion* de, utilt* thriU' tie t'ttrmf* Frtinfitiw, hv Gen-eral Gerard; Paris, 181K): (Je'rurd, servinc under Grouchy <> tin* {nth of June, in command of a corps, having fiercely rtmotiMtrateti agaitiit Grouchy!! refusal to march to the cannon when they worn in Cull hénriK. Tln Primmi Edouard d'Avvergtee also go* into Gmticby*8 cTcmduot in lilt* Watrltxt, p. 270, remarking fairly enough that, though Urouchy alwnyN iii'tltiil received orders from Napoleon to keep between the two rivers and Na}w>l<H>,*

" still General Jomini, while it is often referred to in the account of the St. Helena account is so conformable in that it is in of the Emperor's to which the Emperor owed most of his victories, that it cannot be doubted that